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Abstract
The article investigates influence relation between two sets of agents in a so-
cial network. It proposes a logical system that captures propositional properties of
this relation valid in all threshold models of social networks with the same topo-
logical structure. The logical system consists of Armstrong axioms for functional
dependence and an additional Lighthouse axiom. The main results are soundness,
completeness, and decidability theorems for this logical system.
1 Introduction
In this article we study influence in social networks. When a new product is introduced
to the market, it is usually first adopted by a few users that are called “early adopters".
These users might adopt the product because they are fans of the company introduc-
ing the product, as a result of the marketing campaign conducted by the company, or
because they have a genuine need for this type of product. Once the early adopters
start using the product, they put peer pressure on their friends and acquaintances in the
social network, who might eventually follow them in adopting the product. The friends
of the early adopters might eventually influence their own friends and so on, until the
product is potentially adopted by a significant part of the network.
A similar phenomenon could be observed with diffusion of certain behaviours, like
smoking, adoption of new words and technical innovations, and propagation of beliefs.
There are two most widely used models that formally capture diffusion process in
social networks. One of them is the cascading model [17, 11]. This model distin-
guishes active and inactive vertices of the network. Once a vertex v becomes active,
it gets a single chance to activate each neighbour u with a given probability pv,u. This
process continues until no more activations can happen.
In this article we focus on the second model, called threshold model [23, 13, 10, 1],
originally introduced by Granovetter [7] and Schelling [18]. In this model each agent
has a non-negative threshold value representing the agent’s resistance to adoption of a
given product. If the pressure from those peers of the agent who already adopted the
product reaches the threshold value, then the agent also adopts the product. We assume
that each of the other agents has a non-negative, but possibly zero, influence on the
given agent. The peer pressure on an agent to adopt a product is the sum of influences
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on the agent of all agents who have already adopted the product. It is assumed in this
model that, once the product is adopted, the agent keeps using the product and putting
pressure on her peers indefinitely.
p q r2
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1 27
Figure 1: Social Network N1
Consider, for example, social network N1 depicted in Figure 1. This network con-
sists of three agents: p, q, and r that have threshold values 7, 1, and 2 respectively. The
influence of one agent on another is shown in this figure by the label on the directed
edge connecting the two agents. For instance, the influence of agent r on agent p is 5.
If an agent has zero influence on another agent, then appropriate directed edge is not
shown at all. Thus, influence of agent p on agent r is zero.
Suppose that a marketing company gives agent p a free sample of the product and
the agent starts using it. Since agent p has influence 2 on agent q and threshold value
of agent q is only 1, she will eventually also adopt the product. In turn, adoption of the
product by agent q will eventually lead to adoption of the product by agent r because
threshold value of agent r is only 2 and the influence of agent q on agent r is 3. Thus,
adoption of the product by agent p eventually leads to adoption of this product by agent
r. We denote this fact by N1  pB r.
In this article we study relation ABB between group of agents A and B that could
be informally described1 as “if all agents in set A are given free samples of the product
and they all start using it, then all agents in set B will eventually adopt the product".
For example, for the discussed above social network N1, we have N1  {p}B {q,r},
which we usually write as just N1  pBq,r.
At the same time, if a free sample of the product is given to agent r, then agent q
will eventually adopt it because she has threshold value 1 and the influence of agent
r on her is 4. Once agent q adopts the product, however, the product diffusion stops
and the product will never be adopted by agent p because her threshold value is 7 and
the total peer pressure from agents q and r on p will be only 1+5 = 6. Therefore, for
example, N1  ¬(rB p).
The properties of relation AB B that we have discussed so far were specific to
social network N1. Let us now consider social network N2 depicted in Figure 2. If a
free sample of the product is given in network N2 to agent r and she starts using it,
then, like it was for the network N1, agent q will eventually adopt the product because
her threshold value is only 1 and influence of agent r on agent q is 4. Unlike network
N1, however, the product diffusion does not stop at this point because now total peer
pressure of agents q and r on agent p is still 1+5 = 6, but the threshold value of agent
p in this network is only 5.5. Thus, agent p eventually will adopt the product. In other
words, N2  rB p.
1We formally specify this relation in Definition 7.
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Figure 2: Social Network N2
An interesting property of network N2 is that agent r has threshold value 0. Thus,
she will eventually adopt the product even if no free product samples are given to any
of the agents: N2 ∅B r.
Note that social networks N1 and N2 are different only by the threshold values that
the agents have. The agents in both networks have the same influence on each other.
We will express this by saying that social networks N1 and N2 have the same sociogram.
This common sociogram S1 for networks N1 and N2 is depicted in Figure 3.
p q r2
1 4
3
5
Figure 3: Sociogram S1
To some degree, the threshold values characterize the relation that exists between
the product and the individual agents and the sociogram describes the influence rela-
tion between the agents. The term sociogram has been first introduced by psychoso-
ciologist Jacob Levy Moreno [15]. The sociograms, as defined in this article, are di-
rected weighted graphs. The original Moreno’s sociograms were neither directed nor
weighted. We briefly discuss the unweighted sociograms in the conclusion.
In this article we study not the individual properties of specific social networks, but
the common properties of all social networks with the same sociogram. We write S  φ
if property φ is true for all social networks with sociogram S. For example, as we show
in Proposition 1,
S1  pB r→ qB r. (1)
In other words, under any assignment of threshold values on sociogram S1, if giving
a free sample of the product to agent p will eventually lead to agent r adopting the
product, then giving a free sample of the product to agent q would have the same
effect.
The main result of this article is a complete axiomatization of propositional prop-
erties of relation ABB for any given sociogram. Such axiomatization consists of three
axioms common to all sociograms and a sociogram-specific fourth axiom. The first
three axioms are
1. Reflexivity: ABB if B⊆ A,
2. Transitivity: ABB→ (BBC→ ABC),
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3. Augmentation: ABB→ (A,CBB,C),
where A,B denotes the union of sets A and B. These axioms were originally proposed
by Armstrong [2] to describe functional dependence relation in database theory. They
became known in database literature as Armstrong’s axioms [6, p. 81]. Väänänen
proposed a first order version of these principles [21] and their generalization for rea-
soning about approximate dependency [22]. Beeri, Fagin, and Howard [3] suggested a
variation of Armstrong’s axioms that describes properties of multi-valued dependence.
Naumov and Nicholls [16] proposed another variation of these axioms that describes
rationally functional dependence.
The sociogram-dependent fourth axiom captures the fact that in every group of
agents in which at least one agent eventually adopts the product there is always an
agent (or a subgroup of agents) who adopts the product first. In marketing such agents
are sometimes called lighthouse customers. In any given group of agents, the distinc-
tive property of lighthouse customers is that they adopt the product without any peer
pressure coming from other agents in this group. The lighthouse customers adopt the
product as a result of the peer pressure from the outside of the group. Our fourth axiom
postulates existence of lighthouse customers in any group of agents in which at least
one agent eventually will adopt the product. Thus, we call this postulate Lighthouse
axiom.
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Figure 4: Lighthouse Axiom
One possible way to state Lighthouse axiom is to say that if all agents in network N
are partitioned into disjoint sets A and B, see Figure 4, and there is an agent a ∈ A such
that N  BBa, then there must exist a “lighthouse" agent ` ∈ A such that the total peer
pressure of all agents in set B on agent ` is no less than the threshold value of agent `:
θ ≤ w1 +w2 + · · ·+wk.
Unfortunately, when stated this way, Lighthouse axiom refers to threshold value θ
of agent `. Thus, in this form, it is a property of the social network, rather than the
corresponding sociogram.
It turns out, however, that there is a way to re-word the axiom so that it does not
refer to threshold values. Namely, let us assume that for every agent a ∈ A we choose
a set of agents Ca ⊆ A∪B such that peer pressure of set Ca on agent a is no less than
peer pressure of set B on agent a. The new form of Lighthouse axiom states that, under
the above condition, if N  BB a, then there exists a “lighthouse" agent ` ∈ A such
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that N C`B `. The main result of this article is the completeness theorem for logical
system consisting of this form of Lighthouse axiom and the three Armstrong axioms.
Several logical frameworks for reasoning about diffusion in social networks have
been studied before. Seligman, Liu, and Girard [19] proposed Facebook Logic for cap-
turing properties of epistemic social networks in modal language, but did not give any
axiomatization for this logic. They further developed this approach in papers [20, 12].
In particular, they introduced dynamic friendship relations. Christoff and Hansen [4]
simplified Seligman, Liu, and Girard setting and gave a complete axiomatization of the
logical system for this new setting. Christoff and Rendsvig proposed Minimal Thresh-
old Influence Logic [5] that uses modal language to capture dynamic of diffusion in a
threshold model and gave complete axiomatization of this logic. The languages of the
described above systems are significantly different from ours and, as a result, neither
of these systems contains principles similar to our Lighthouse axiom.
Diffusion in social networks is a special case of information flow on graphs. Log-
ical systems for reasoning about various types of graph information flow has been
studied before. Lighthouse axiom has certain resemblance with Gateway axiom for
functional dependence on hypergraphs of secrets [14], Contiguity axiom [8] for graph-
ical games, and Shield Wall axiom for fault tolerance in belief formation networks [9].
This article is organized as following. In Section 2 we introduce formal syntax
and semantics of our logical system. Section 3 list the four axioms of the system. In
Section 4, we give several examples of formal proofs in our system. In Section 5 we
show some auxiliary results that are used later. Section 6 and Section 7 prove soundness
and completeness theorems respectively. Section 9 concludes with a discussion of
logical properties of unweighted sociograms.
2 Syntax and Semantics
In this section we formally define social network, sociogram, and influence relation.
Definition 1. For any finite set A , let Φ(A ) be the minimal set of formulas such that
1. ⊥ ∈Φ(A ),
2. ABB ∈Φ(A ), for each subsets A,B⊆A ,
3. φ → ψ ∈Φ(A ) for each φ ,ψ ∈Φ(A ).
We assume that disjunction ∨ is defined through implication→ and false constant
⊥ in the standard way.
Definition 2. A social network is triple (A ,w,θ), where
1. A is an arbitrary finite set (of agents),
2. w is a function that maps A 2 into non-negative real numbers. Value w(a,b)
represents influence of agent a on agent b.
3. θ is a function that maps A into non-negative real numbers. Value θ(a) repre-
sents threshold value of agent a ∈A .
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Definition 3. A sociogram is pair (A ,w), where set A and function w satisfy the first
two conditions of Definition 2.
We say that social network (A ,w,θ) is based on sociogram (A ,w). We now pro-
ceed to define peer pressure on an agent by a group of agents in a given sociogram.
Definition 4. For any sociogram (A ,w) and any subset of agents A⊆A , let ‖A‖b =
∑a∈A w(a,b).
In the introduction we said that if, at some moment in time, an agent experience
peer pressure higher than her threshold value, then at some point in the future she will
adopt the product. For the sake of simplicity, in our formal model we assume that time
is discrete and that if at moment k an agent experiences sufficient peer pressure, then
she adopts the product at moment k+1. Although this assumption, generally speaking,
affects the “time dynamics" of product diffusion, it does not affect the final outcome of
diffusion. Thus, this assumption, while simplifying the formal setting, does not change
the properties of influence relation ABB. Given this assumption, if free samples of the
product are given to all agents in set A at moment 0, then by Ak we mean the set of all
agents who will adopt the product by moment k. The formal definition of Ak is below.
Definition 5. For any A⊆A and any k ∈N, let subset Ak ⊆A be defined recursively
as follows:
1. A0 = A,
2. Ak+1 = Ak ∪{x ∈A | ‖Ak‖x ≥ θ(x)}.
Corollary 1. (An)k = An+k.
If free samples of the product are given to all agents in set A, then by A∗ we mean
the set of all agents who will eventually adopt the product. The formal definition of A∗
is below.
Definition 6.
A∗ =
⋃
k≥0
Ak.
The next definition specifies the formal semantics of our logical system. In partic-
ular, item 2 in this definition specifies the formal meaning of the influence relation.
Definition 7. For any social network N = (A ,w,θ) and any φ ∈ Φ(A ), let satisfia-
bility relation N  φ be defined as follows
1. N 2⊥,
2. N  ABB if B⊆ A∗,
3. N  ψ → χ if N 2 ψ or N  χ .
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3 Axioms
Our logical system for an arbitrary sociogram S = (A ,w) consists of propositional
tautologies in language Φ(A ) and the following additional axioms:
1. Reflexivity: ABB if B⊆ A,
2. Transitivity: ABB→ (BBC→ ABC),
3. Augmentation: ABB→ (A,CBB,C),
4. Lighthouse: if AunionsqB is a partition of the set of all agents A and {Ca}a∈A is a
family of sets of agents such that ‖B‖a ≤ ‖Ca‖a for each a ∈ A, then∨
a∈A
BBa→
∨
a∈A
CaBa.
We write `S φ if formula φ can be derived in our system using Modus Ponens
inference rule. We sometimes write just ` φ if the value of subscript S is clear from the
context. We also write X `S φ if formula φ could be derived in our system extended by
the set of additional axioms X .
4 Examples
In this section we give three examples of formal proofs in our logical system. Sound-
ness of this system is shown in Section 6. We start by proving statement (1) from the
introduction.
Proposition 1. `S1 pB r→ qB r, where S1 is the sociogram depicted in Figure 3.
p q r2
1 4
3
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A
Figure 5: Towards Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let A = {r}, B = {p,q}, and Cr = {q}, see Figure 5. Note that
‖B‖r = w(p,r)+w(q,r) = 0+3 = 3 = w(q,r) = ‖Cr‖r.
Hence, by Lighthouse axiom,
` p,qB r→ qB r. (2)
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At the same time, by Transitivity axiom,
` p,qB p→ (pB r→ p,qB r).
By Reflexivity axiom, ` p,qB p. Thus, by Modus Ponens inference rule,
` pB r→ p,qB r.
Therefore, ` pB r→ qB r using statement (2) and propositional logic reasoning.
p q r2 3
Figure 6: Sociogram S2
Let us now consider sociogram S2 depicted on Figure 6. Since on this sociogram
agent r has higher influence on agent q than agent p has, one might expect the following
statement to be true for all social networks over sociogram S2:
pBq→ rBq. (3)
Surprisingly, this is false. Namely, this statement is false for the social network de-
picted in Figure 7. This happens because agent r in this social network has threshold
p q r2 3
1 4 0
Figure 7: Social Network
value 0. In other words, agent r is an “early adopter" who does not need any ex-
ternal peer pressure in order to buy the product. As a result, see Figure 8, we have
{p}1 = {p,r}. Once agent r adopts the product, the total peer pressure on agent q be-
comes 2+3 = 5 and she will adopt the product as well. On the other hand, if the free
sample is given to agent r, then neither agent p nor agent q ever adopt the product.
Although statement (3) holds not for all social networks over sociogram S2, in the
next proposition we show that a slightly modified version of this statement does hold
for all such networks.
Proposition 2. `S2 pB q→ (rB q∨∅B r), where S2 is the sociogram depicted in
Figure 6.
Proof. Let A = {q,r}, B = {p}, Cq = {r}, and Cr =∅, see Figure 9. Note that
‖B‖q = w(p,q) = 2< 3 = w(r,q) = ‖Cq‖q
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Figure 8: Social Network
p q r2 3
A
B Cq Cr
Figure 9: Towards Proof of Proposition 2
and
‖B‖r = w(p,r) = 0 = ‖∅‖r = ‖Cr‖r.
Thus, by Lighthouse axiom,
` pBq∨ pB r→ rBq∨∅B r.
Therefore, ` pB r→ rBq∨∅B r.
p q r1 3
4
2
Figure 10: Sociogram S3
Proposition 3. `S3 qB p∨qB r→ pB r∨ rB p, where S3 is the sociogram depicted
in Figure 10.
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Figure 11: Towards Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Let A = {p,r}, B = {q}, Cp = {r}, and Cr = {p}, see Figure 11. Note that
‖B‖p = w(q, p) = 1< 2 = w(r, p) = ‖Cp‖p
and
‖B‖r = w(q,r) = 3< 4 = w(p,r) = ‖Cr‖r.
Therefore, by Lighthouse axiom,
` qB p∨qB r→ pB r∨ rB p.
5 Properties of Star Closure
In this section we prove several technical properties of A∗ that are used later in the
proofs of soundness and completeness.
Lemma 1. If A1 = A, then Ak = A for each k ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on k. If k = 0, then A0 = A by Definition 5.
If k > 0, then by Corollary 1, assumption A1 = A, and the induction hypothesis,
Ak = (A1)k−1 = Ak−1 = A.
Lemma 2. A∗ = Ak for some k ≥ 0.
Proof. The statement of the lemma follows from the assumption in Definition 2 that
set A is finite.
Lemma 3. If x /∈ A∗, then θ(x)> ‖A∗‖x, for each subset A⊆A and each agent x∈A .
Proof. By Lemma 2, there is k ≥ 0 such that A∗ = Ak. Suppose that ‖A∗‖x ≥ θ(x).
Thus, ‖Ak‖x ≥ θ(x). Hence, x ∈ Ak+1, by Definition 5. Thus, x ∈ A∗ by Definition 6,
which is a contradiction to the assumption of the lemma.
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Lemma 4. A⊆ A∗.
Proof. By Definition 5 and Definition 6,
A = A0 ⊆
⋃
k≥0
Ak = A∗.
Lemma 5. (A∗)∗ ⊆ A∗.
Proof. By Lemma 2, there are n,k ≥ 0 such that A∗ = An and (A∗)∗ = (A∗)k. Thus, by
Corollary 1 and Definition 6,
(A∗)∗ = (A∗)k = (An)k = An+k ⊆
⋃
m≥0
Am = A∗.
Lemma 6. If A⊆ B, then Ak ⊆ Bk, for each k ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove the statement of the lemma by induction on k. If k = 0, then A0 =
A⊆ B = B0 by Definition 5.
Suppose that Ak ⊆ Bk. Let x ∈ Ak+1. It suffices to show that x ∈ Bk+1. Indeed, by
Definition 5, assumption x ∈ Ak+1 implies that either x ∈ Ak or ‖Ak‖x ≥ θ(x). In the
first case, by the induction hypothesis, x ∈ Ak ⊆ Bk. Thus, x ∈ Bk. Therefore, x ∈ Bk+1
by Definition 5.
In the second case, by Definition 4 and assumption Ak ⊆ Bk,
‖Bk‖x = ∑
b∈Bk
w(b,x)≥ ∑
a∈Ak
w(a,x) = ‖Ak‖x ≥ θ(x).
Therefore, x ∈ Bk+1 by Definition 5.
Corollary 2. If A⊆ B, then A∗ ⊆ B∗.
Lemma 7. A∗∪B∗ ⊆ (A∪B)∗.
Proof. Note that A⊆ A∪B and B⊆ A∪B. Thus, A∗ ⊆ (A∪B)∗ and B∗ ⊆ (A∪B)∗ by
Corollary 2. Therefore, A∗∪B∗ ⊆ (A∪B)∗.
6 Soundness
In this section we prove the soundness of our logical system with respect to the se-
mantics given in Definition 7. The soundness of propositional tautologies and Modus
Ponens inference rule is straightforward. Below we show the soundness of each of the
remaining four axioms as separate lemmas. In the lemmas that follow we assume that
S = (A ,w,θ) is a social network and A, B, and C are subsets of A .
Lemma 8. If B⊆ A, then S  ABB.
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Proof. By Lemma 4, A⊆A∗. Thus, B⊆A∗ by the assumption of the lemma. Therefore,
S  ABB, by Definition 7.
Lemma 9. If S  ABB and S  BBC, then S  ABC.
Proof. By Definition 7, assumption S  ABB implies that B⊆ A∗. Hence, B∗ ⊆ (A∗)∗
by Corollary 2. Thus, B∗ ⊆ A∗ by Lemma 5. At the same time, C ⊆ B∗ by assumption
S  BBC and Definition 7. Thus, C ⊆ A∗. Therefore, S  ABC by Definition 7.
Lemma 10. If S  ABB, then S  A,CBB,C.
Proof. Suppose that S  ABB. Thus, B ⊆ A∗ by Definition 7. Note that C ⊆ C∗ by
Lemma 4. Thus,
B∪C ⊆ A∗∪C∗ ⊆ (A∪C)∗,
by Lemma 7. Therefore, S  A,CBB,C, by Definition 7.
Lemma 11. If S  BB a0 for some a0 ∈ A, then there is ` ∈ A such that S  C`B `,
where AunionsqB is a partition of the set of all agents A and {Ca}a∈A is a family of sets of
agents such that ‖B‖a ≤ ‖Ca‖a for each a ∈ A.
Proof. Note that assumption S  BB a0 by Definition 7 implies that a0 ∈ B∗. On the
other hand, assumption a0 ∈ A implies that a0 /∈ B because AunionsqB is a partition of set
A . Thus, B∗ 6= B. Hence, by Definition 6, there must exist k such that Bk 6= B. Then,
B1 6= B by Lemma 1. Thus, there must exist ` ∈ B1 \ B. Hence, ‖B‖` ≥ θ(`) by
Definition 5. Then, by the assumption of the lemma, ‖C`‖` ≥ ‖B‖` ≥ θ(`). Thus,
` ∈ C1` , by Definition 5. Hence, ` ∈ C∗` by Definition 6. Therefore, S  C` B ` by
Definition 7. Finally, note that ` ∈ A because ` ∈ B1 \B and AunionsqB is a partition of the
set A .
This concludes the proof of the soundness of our logical system.
7 Completeness
In this section we proof the completeness of our logical system with respect to the
semantics given in Definition 7. This result is formally stated as Theorem 1 in the
end of this section. The proof of completeness theorem consists in the construction
of a “canonical" social network. We start, however, we a few technical lemmas and
definitions.
7.1 Preliminaries
Let us first prove a useful property of real numbers.
Lemma 12. If ε > 0 is a real number and x and y are any real numbers such that either
x = y or |x− y|> ε . Then, x+ ε > y implies x≥ y.
Proof. Suppose y> x. Hence, x 6= y. Thus, |x−y|> ε , by the assumption of the lemma.
Then, y− x> ε , because y> x. Therefore, x+ ε < y.
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We now assume a fixed sociogram (A ,w) and a fixed maximal consistent subset X
of Φ(A ).
Definition 8. Â = {a ∈A | X ` ABa} for each subset A⊆A .
Choose ε to be any positive real number such that ε < ‖A‖a−‖B‖a for each agent
a ∈ A and each subsets A,B ⊆ A , such that ‖A‖a > ‖B‖a. This could be achieved
because set A is finite.
Lemma 13. For any subsets A,B⊆A and any agent a ∈A if ‖A‖a + ε > ‖B‖a, then
‖A‖a ≥ ‖B‖a.
Proof. By the choice of ε , we have either ‖A‖a = ‖B‖a or |(‖A‖a−‖B‖a)|> ε . Thus,
‖A‖a ≥ ‖B‖a by Lemma 12.
Lemma 14. A⊆ Â for each subset A⊆A .
Proof. Suppose that a ∈ A. Thus, ` AB a by Reflexivity axiom. Therefore, a ∈ Â by
Definition 8.
Lemma 15. X ` AB Â, for each subset A⊆A .
Proof. Let Â = {a1, . . . ,an}. By the definition of Â, X ` AB ai, for any i ≤ n. We
prove, by induction on k, that X ` ABa1, . . . ,ak for each 0≤ k ≤ n.
Base Case: X ` AB∅ by Reflexivity axiom.
Induction Step: Assume that X ` ABa1, . . . ,ak. By Augmentation axiom,
X ` A,ak+1Ba1, . . . ,ak,ak+1. (4)
Recall that X ` AB ak+1. Again by Augmentation axiom, X ` ABA,ak+1. Hence,
X ` ABa1, . . . ,ak,ak+1, by (4) and Transitivity axiom.
7.2 Canonical Social Network
Next, based on the sociogram (A ,w) and the maximal consistent set X , we define
“canonical" social network NX = (A ,w,θ). We then proceed to prove the core proper-
ties of this network.
Definition 9.
θ(a) =
{
0, if X `∅Ba,
maxa/∈B̂ ‖B̂‖a + ε, otherwise.
The maximum in the above definition is taken over all subsets B of A such that B̂
does not contain agent a.
Lemma 16. Function θ(a) is well-defined for each a ∈A .
Proof. We need to show that if X 0∅Ba, then there is at least one subset B⊆A such
that a /∈ B̂. It suffices to show that a /∈ ∅̂, which is true due to assumption X 0 ∅B a
and Definition 8.
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Lemma 17. For any subset B⊆A , if a ∈A \B∗, then there is C⊆A such that a /∈ Ĉ
and θ(a) = ‖Ĉ‖a + ε .
Proof. If θ(a) = 0, then, a ∈ B1 due to Definition 5. Thus, a ∈ B∗ by Definition 6,
which is a contradiction to the assumption a ∈A \B∗.
Suppose now that θ(a)> 0, thus, by Definition 9, there is at least one C ⊆A such
that a /∈ Ĉ and θ(a) = ‖Ĉ‖a + ε .
Lemma 18. If B⊆A and a ∈A \ B̂, then θ(a)> ‖B̂‖a.
Proof. Case I: X `∅Ba. Note that X ` BB∅ by Reflexivity axiom. Thus, X ` BBa
by Transitivity axiom. Hence, a ∈ B̂ by Definition 8, which is a contradiction to the
assumption of the lemma.
Case II: if X 0 ∅Ba, then θ(a)> ‖B̂‖a by Definition 9.
Lemma 19. (B̂)k = B̂ for each B⊆A and each k ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove this statement by induction on k. If k = 0, then (B̂)k = B̂, by Defini-
tion 5. Note next that by Definition 5, the induction hypothesis, and Lemma 18,
(B̂)k+1 = (B̂)k ∪{a ∈A | ‖(B̂)k‖a ≥ θ(a)}
= B̂∪{a ∈A | ‖B̂‖a ≥ θ(a)}
= B̂∪{a ∈A \ B̂ | ‖B̂‖a ≥ θ(a)}= B̂∪∅= B̂.
Lemma 20. (B̂)∗ = B̂ for each B⊆A .
Proof. By Definition 6 and Lemma 19,
(B̂)∗ =
⋃
k≥0
(B̂)k =
⋃
k≥0
B̂ = B̂.
Lemma 21. For each B⊆A , if a ∈ B∗, then X ` BBa.
Proof. Suppose a ∈ B∗. By Lemma 14, B ⊆ B̂. Then, B∗ ⊆ (B̂)∗ Corollary 2. Thus,
a ∈ (B̂)∗. Hence, a ∈ B̂ by Lemma 20. Therefore, X ` BBa by Definition 8.
Lemma 22. For each B⊆A and each a ∈A , if X ` BBa, then a ∈ B∗.
Proof. By Lemma 3, θ(x)> ‖B∗‖x for each x∈A \B∗. At the same time, by Lemma 17,
for each x ∈ A \ B∗ there is Cx such that x /∈ Ĉx and θ(x) = ‖Ĉx‖x + ε . Hence,
‖Ĉx‖x + ε > ‖B∗‖x for each x ∈ A \ B∗. Thus, by Lemma 13, ‖Ĉx‖x ≥ ‖B∗‖x for
each x ∈A \B∗.
Consider partition (A \B∗)unionsqB∗ of A . By Lighthouse axiom,
`
∨
x∈A \B∗
B∗B x→
∨
x∈A \B∗
ĈxB x. (5)
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Suppose that a /∈ B∗, Lemma 4 and Reflexivity axiom imply that ` B∗BB. Thus, by
assumption X ` BBa and Transitivity axiom, X ` B∗Ba. Hence, statement (5) implies
that
X `
∨
x∈A \B∗
ĈxB x.
Then, due to the maximality of set X , there must exist x0 ∈ A \B∗ such that X `
Ĉx0 B x0. Thus, X `Cx0 B x0, due to Lemma 15 and Transitivity axiom:
`Cx0 BĈx0 → (Ĉx0 B x0→Cx0 B x0).
Hence, x0 ∈ Ĉx0 by Definition 8, which is a contradiction with the choice of Cx.
Lemma 23. NX  φ if and only if φ ∈ X, for each formula φ ∈Φ(A ).
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on structural complexity of formula φ . Cases
when formula φ is⊥ or has form ψ1→ψ2 follow in the standard way from Definition 7
and the assumptions of maximality and consistency of set X . Suppose that φ has form
ABB.
(⇒) : Suppose that NX  ABB. Then B ⊆ A∗ by Definition 7. Hence, b ∈ A∗ for
each b ∈ B. Thus, X ` ABb for each b ∈ B by Lemma 21. Hence, b ∈ Â for each b ∈ B
by Definition 8. In other words, B ⊆ Â. Thus, by Reflexivity axiom, ` ÂBB. On the
other hand, X ` AB Â by Lemma 15. Therefore, X ` ABB by Transitivity axiom.
(⇐) : Assume X ` ABB. By Reflexivity axiom, ` BB b for every b ∈ B. Hence,
X ` AB b for each b ∈ B by Transitivity axiom. Thus, b ∈ A∗ for each b ∈ B, by
Lemma 22. In other words, B⊆ A∗. Therefore, NX  ABB by Definition 7.
7.3 Main Result
We are now ready to state and prove the completeness theorem for our logical system
with respect to the semantics given in Definition 7.
Theorem 1. For any sociogram (A ,w) and any formula φ ∈Φ(A ), if N  φ for each
social network N based on sociogram (A ,w), then ` φ .
Proof. Suppose that 0 φ . Let X be a maximal consistent subset of Φ(A ) such that
φ /∈ X . By Lemma 23, NX 2 φ .
8 Decidability
In this section we discuss decidability of our logical system for any fixed sociogram
(A ,w). Note that we allow arbitrary real numbers as subscripts in formula ABc B.
Thus, the set of all formulas Φ(A ) is uncountable and its elements can not be used
as inputs of a Turing machine. In order to avoid this issue, in this section we modify
Definition 1, Definition 2, and Definition 3 by assuming that only rational numbers
could be used as subscripts in our atomic formulas ABc B, as influence values, and as
threshold values. It is easy to see that the above proof of completeness is still valid.
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From this change point of view, the only non-trivial place is the choice of ε for the
given sociogram (A ,w) that we have made right after Definition 8. Note, however,
that the required ε could always be choose to be a rational number because 0 is a limit
point of the set of positive rational numbers.
Theorem 2. For any given sociogram S =(A ,w), set {φ ∈Φ(A ) | `S φ} is decidable.
Proof. According to Theorem 1, `S φ if and only if formula φ is true for each social
network (A ,w,θ) based on sociogram S. This, of course, does not imply the decidabil-
ity because there are infinitely many social networks based on sociogram S. However,
it turns out that the proof of Theorem 1 that we gave above actually shows a stronger
result: `S φ if and only if formula φ is true for each social network from a specific
finite class C(S) of networks based on sociogram S.
Once existence of such finite class of social networks C(S) is establish, we should
be able to claim the decidability result because one can always verify if a formula φ is
true for each out of finitely many given networks.
We are now ready to describe finite class of social networks C(S). The social
network over sociogram S is completely defined by specifying threshold function θ .
In the proof of Theorem 1, this is done in Definition 9. This definition depends on ε
and maximal consistent set of formulas X . Note however that the choice of ε does not
depend on X and could be made based on sociogram S alone. Once ε is fixed, the set
of all values of function θ , as specified in Definition 9, belongs to finite set
{0}∪{‖A‖a + ε | a ∈A ,A⊆A }.
The set of all social networks over sociogram S whose threshold functions use only
values from the above set is the desired finite class of social networks C(S).
9 Conclusion
In this article we have studied properties of influence common to all social networks
with the same weighted sociogram. We described all such properties in the proposi-
tional language by introducing a logical system for reasoning about these properties
and proving soundness and completeness of this system. We have established that the
logical system is decidable if its syntax and semantics are restricted to rational num-
bers.
A natural extension of this work is to consider common influence properties of
social network with the same unweighted sociogram, in which presence of a directed
edge between two agents means that one agent might have non-zero influence on the
other agent. Absence of a directed edge means that the influence of one agent on the
other is zero.
Although an unweighted sociogram is a simpler structure than weighted sociogram,
there are some very non-trivial properties of influence relation common to all social
networks with the same unweighted sociogram.
Consider, for example, unweighted sociogram U1 depicted in Figure 12. Let N =
(A ,w,θ) be a social network based on U1. Furthermore, assume that in social network
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p1
p2
r
q1
q2
Figure 12: Unweighted Sociogram U1
N (i) neither of the agents p1, p2,q1,q2 is an early adopter, (ii) N  p1, p2B r, and (iii)
N  q1,q2B r. Thus, w(p1,r)+w(p2,r) ≥ θ(r) and w(q1,r)+w(q2,r) ≥ θ(r). The
first inequality implies that at least one out of w(p1,r) and w(p2,r) is greater or equal
than θ(r)/2. In other words, there is i ∈ {1,2} such that w(pi,r)≥ θ/2. Similarly, the
second inequality implies that there is j ∈ {1,2} such that w(q j,r)≥ θ/2. Thus,
‖{pi,q j}‖r = w(pi,r)+w(q j,)≥ θ/2+θ/2 = θ .
Hence, r ∈ {pi,q j}1 ⊆ {pi,q j}∗. Then, N  pi,q jB r. So, we have shown that for any
social network N based on unweighted sociogram U1 and satisfying the conditions (i),
(ii), (iii), there are i, j ∈ {1,2} such that N  pi,q jB r. This could be formally stated as
U2  p1, p2B r∧q1,q2B r
→
2∨
i=1
2∨
j=1
pi,q jB r∨
∨
x∈{p1,p2,q1,q2}
∅B x,
where disjunction
∨
x∈{p1,p2,q1,q2}∅Bx captures the statement that one of agents p1, p2,q1,q2
is an early adopter. The above principle is just an example of a non-trivial property of
diffusion common to all social networks with the same unweighted sociogram. This
example can be stated in a more general form as
U2 
n∧
i=1
pi1, pi2, . . . , pinBq
→
n∨
j1=1
n∨
j2=1
. . .
n∨
jn=1
p1 j1 , p2 j2 , . . . , pn jn Bq
∨
n∨
i=1
n∨
j=1
∅B pi j,
where U2 is unweighted sociogram depicted in Figure 13. Complete axiomatization
of properties of influence common to all social networks with a given unweighted so-
ciogram remains an open problem.
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